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Financial Market Supervision: European Perspectives 
Abstract 
[Excerpt] The global financial crisis has sparked a debate over the cause and impact of the crisis. 
Academics and policymakers are searching for changes in the financial system that can correct any 
perceived weaknesses in the structure of regulation, the content of regulations, and the coverage of 
financial instruments and activities. Since the onset of the crisis, numerous proposals have been 
advanced to reform or amend the current financial system to help restore economic growth. In the United 
States, the Obama Administration has proposed a plan to overhaul supervision of the U.S. financial 
services sector. The proposal would give new authority to the Federal Reserve, create a new Financial 
Services Oversight Council, create a Consumer Financial Protection Agency, and create a new National 
Bank Supervisor to replace the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Office of Thrift 
Supervision. In contrast, Senator Collins introduced S. 664, the Financial System Stabilization and Reform 
Act of 2009, with a companion measure, H.R. 1754, that was introduced by Representative Castle in the 
House of Representatives. The measures would create a Financial Stability Council and grant the Federal 
Reserve the authority to examine the soundness and safety of the financial system posed by bank holding 
companies. Other measures include: S. 1682 (Senator Cantwell), the Derivatives Market Manipulation 
Prevention Act of 2009; S. 1803 (Senator Merkley), the Federal Reserve Accountability Act of 2009; S. 
2756 (Senator Warner) the Financial Services Systemic Risk Oversight Council Act of 2009; H.R. 3795 
(Representative Frank), the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets Acts of 2009; H.R. 3968 (Representative 
Ellison), to amend the Bank Holding Company Act; and H.R. 3996 (Frank), to improve financial stability. 
The crisis has underscored the fact that national and international financial markets have become highly 
integrated, and problems in one market can trigger contagion that can spread both among countries and 
into economic sectors to affect businesses, employment, and household well being. 
Similarly, governments in Europe are considering what, if any, changes they should make to their national 
financial systems. Along with the United States and other countries, European countries also are 
considering changes to the international systems of financial supervision and regulation in order to 
ensure prosperity through the smooth operation of domestic and international financial systems. This 
process may include reconsidering the roles and responsibility of the central banks in the post-financial 
crisis era. Various organizations and groups are advancing a large number of recommendations and 
prescriptions. Some goals for any such adjustments may include providing an institutional structure for 
oversight and regulation that is robust, comprehensive, flexible, and politically feasible while providing 
appropriate incentive structures to preclude excessive risk-taking. Of course, there are no guarantees that 
amending the current system or employing a different regulatory and supervisory structure will preclude a 
repeat of the most recent financial crisis given that financial markets and institutions are continually 
growing, innovating, and responding to government- and market-imposed constraints. 
This report addresses the European perspectives on a number of proposals that are being advanced for 
financial oversight and regulation in Europe. The European experience may be instructive because 
financial markets in Europe are well developed, European firms often are competitors of U.S. firms, and 
European governments have faced severe problems of integration and consistency across the various 
financial structures that exist in Europe. 
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Summary 
The global financial crisis has sparked a debate over the cause and impact of the crisis. 
Academics and policymakers are searching for changes in the financial system that can correct 
any perceived weaknesses in the structure of regulation, the content of regulations, and the 
coverage of financial instruments and activities. Since the onset of the crisis, numerous proposals 
have been advanced to reform or amend the current financial system to help restore economic 
growth. In the United States, the Obama Administration has proposed a plan to overhaul 
supervision of the U.S. financial services sector. The proposal would give new authority to the 
Federal Reserve, create a new Financial Services Oversight Council, create a Consumer Financial 
Protection Agency, and create a new National Bank Supervisor to replace the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency and the Office of Thrift Supervision. In contrast, Senator Collins 
introduced S. 664, the Financial System Stabilization and Reform Act of 2009, with a companion 
measure, H.R. 1754, that was introduced by Representative Castle in the House of 
Representatives. The measures would create a Financial Stability Council and grant the Federal 
Reserve the authority to examine the soundness and safety of the financial system posed by bank 
holding companies. Other measures include: S. 1682 (Senator Cantwell), the Derivatives Market 
Manipulation Prevention Act of 2009; S. 1803 (Senator Merkley), the Federal Reserve 
Accountability Act of 2009; S. 2756 (Senator Warner) the Financial Services Systemic Risk 
Oversight Council Act of 2009; H.R. 3795 (Representative Frank), the Over-the-Counter 
Derivatives Markets Acts of 2009; H.R. 3968 (Representative Ellison), to amend the Bank 
Holding Company Act; and H.R. 3996 (Frank), to improve financial stability. The crisis has 
underscored the fact that national and international financial markets have become highly 
integrated, and problems in one market can trigger contagion that can spread both among 
countries and into economic sectors to affect businesses, employment, and household well being.  
Similarly, governments in Europe are considering what, if any, changes they should make to their 
national financial systems. Along with the United States and other countries, European countries 
also are considering changes to the international systems of financial supervision and regulation 
in order to ensure prosperity through the smooth operation of domestic and international financial 
systems. This process may include reconsidering the roles and responsibility of the central banks 
in the post-financial crisis era. Various organizations and groups are advancing a large number of 
recommendations and prescriptions. Some goals for any such adjustments may include providing 
an institutional structure for oversight and regulation that is robust, comprehensive, flexible, and 
politically feasible while providing appropriate incentive structures to preclude excessive risk-
taking. Of course, there are no guarantees that amending the current system or employing a 
different regulatory and supervisory structure will preclude a repeat of the most recent financial 
crisis given that financial markets and institutions are continually growing, innovating, and 
responding to government- and market-imposed constraints. 
This report addresses the European perspectives on a number of proposals that are being 
advanced for financial oversight and regulation in Europe. The European experience may be 
instructive because financial markets in Europe are well developed, European firms often are 
competitors of U.S. firms, and European governments have faced severe problems of integration 
and consistency across the various financial structures that exist in Europe. 
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Overview 
The global financial crisis has resulted in huge losses in wealth, jobs, and economic activity. In 
some cases, it has led to public demonstrations and to changes in national governments. 
Academics and policymakers generally agree that the financial system can benefit from additional 
supervision or regulation that addresses issues of systemic risk. Such efforts, however, likely will 
require hard, and possibly politically unpopular, decisions concerning the supervision and 
regulation of domestic financial markets and new layers of international coordination that could 
challenge entrenched national interests. Furthermore, there are no metrics for gauging whether 
such measures are a prescription for curing the current crisis or are a policy framework for 
preventing the next crisis, since financial markets are constantly innovating and responding to 
regulation and oversight. In addition, there are no models of market oversight or supervision that 
have proven to be clearly superior. In the absence of such a model, policymakers face a blizzard 
of recommendations, but few assurances that changes to domestic and international financial 
frameworks, most likely achieved with considerable institutional and political resistance, will 
preclude another crisis. 
Currently, national governments are using a number of approaches to supervise financial markets. 
While the current situation is quite fluid, there seems to be some movement in national 
supervisory frameworks toward an integrated approach, as used in Great Britain and Germany. 
Regardless of which structural form is employed, regulating financial activities at the national 
level is complicated by the nature of modern financial markets that have become highly complex 
and interdependent. While regulation is set largely in a national context, financial institutions are 
international in their activities. Without consistent regulatory standards across national 
boundaries, banks, insurers, and securities companies can move their activities to jurisdictions 
with looser standards. National governments, however, generally are loathe to cede sovereignty to 
any supra-national institution, and efforts to reshape national financial authorities often face stiff 
opposition from entrenched interest groups. 
Furthermore, national financial markets are not clones of one another, but reflect differences in 
the way they have been organized and philosophical differences over the way they are regulated 
and supervised. Indeed, national financial markets are custom-made structures that reflect 
differences in national experiences, government institutions, laws, and national customs. One 
thing the crisis has demonstrated, though, is that despite these differences, financial markets have 
become highly integrated. As a result, it has become increasingly more difficult, as evidenced by 
the current financial crisis, to contain financial problems in one market from affecting markets in 
seemingly unrelated areas. 
The European Union has taken a number of steps to improve financial supervision among its 
members, including: strengthening the roles of advisory Committees in the areas of securities, 
banking, and insurance regulators; adopting regulations on credit rating agencies; providing 
funding in support of international accounting standards; and considering a measure to register 
hedge funds. The EU also adopted a proposal to have a European Systemic Risk Council and a 
European System of Financial Supervisors that will serve as advisors to EC members in providing 
advice in both macro and micro prudential supervision. The United States has chosen to take a 
different approach that could potentially strengthen the role of the Federal Reserve and create a 
new consumer watchdog agency, among other proposals. 
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The European Union 
The European Union (EU) is a political and economic union of 27 member states, formally 
established in 1993 by the Treaty of Maastricht out of existing structures that had evolved in steps 
since the 1950s. The EU has worked to develop a single economic market through a standardized 
system of laws which apply across all member states and which provide the freedom of 
movement of people, goods, services and capital. This process of economic integration is 
complicated by a dual system that gives the members of the EU significant independence within 
the EU and broad discretion to interpret and implement EU directives. EU economic integration 
is compounded further by sixteen member states, collectively known as the Eurozone1, which 
have adopted the euro as a common currency and operate as a bloc within the EU. Major 
institutions and bodies of the EU include the European Commission, the European Parliament, 
the Council of the European Union, the European Council, the European Court of Justice, and the 
European Central Bank (ECB). Through various Directives, the EU has moved to increase 
financial integration within the Union to make the monetary union represented by the Eurozone 
operate more efficiently.  
Within the EU, the European Commission operates as the executive branch and is responsible for 
proposing legislation, implementing decisions, upholding the Union’s treaties, and the general 
day-to-day running of the Union. The Commission operates as a cabinet government, with one 
Commissioner from each member. One of the 27 is the Commission President (currently José 
Manuel Barroso) appointed by the European Council, with the approval of the European 
Parliament, for a term of five years. Relative to the financial sector, the EU process provides for 
each member to have its own institutional and legal framework, which complicates efforts to 
coordinate financial policies. The Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) is one of 
the oldest bodies within the European Council. ECOFIN is responsible for economic policy 
coordination, economic surveillance, monitoring budget policy and preparing the EU’s budget.  
There are three main procedures the EU uses to enact legislation. These procedures are co-
decision, assent, and consultation. The co-decision procedure, also known as the Article 251 
procedure (Article 251 of the Treaty of Rome), is the main legislative process the EU employs to 
adopt directives and regulations. The Council and the European Parliament jointly adopt 
legislation based on a proposal by the European Commission. Both Parliament and the Council 
are required to agree on an identical bill before the measure can be adopted. In general terms, 
Parliament is considered to have adopted a measure if it fails to reject the proposed measure 
within three months after it has been adopted by the Council. Under the assent procedure, the 
Council can adopt a measure proposed by the Commission if it receives the assent of Parliament. 
Under the consultation procedure, the Council, acting unanimously or as a qualified majority, can 
adopt legislation developed by the Commission after it has consulted with Parliament.  
Since the start of the financial crisis, the European Union has taken a number of steps to improve 
supervision of financial markets. These actions include: 
• Strengthened the Committee of European Securities Regulators. The Committee 
is an advisory body without any regulatory authority within the European 
                                               
1
 Members of the euro area are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. 
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Commission. The Directive of January 23, 2009, strengthened the Committee’s 
authority to mediate and coordinate securities regulations between EU members. 
• Strengthened the Committee of European Banking Supervisors. The Committee 
is an advisory body without any regulatory authority that coordinates banking 
supervision. The EU Directive of January 23, 2009, broadened the role of the 
Committee to include supervision of financial conglomerates. 
• Strengthened the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Supervisors. The Committee is an advisory body without any regulatory authority 
within the European Commission in the areas of insurance, reinsurance, and 
occupational pensions fields. The January 23, 2009, Directive authorizes the 
Committee to coordinate policies among EU members and between the EU and 
national governments and other bodies. 
• The European Parliament and the European Council approved on April 23, 2009 
new regulations on credit rating agencies that are expected to improve the quality 
and transparency of the ratings agencies. 
• Approved direct funding by the European Union to the International Accounting 
Standards Committee Foundation, the European Financial Reporting Advisory 
Group, and the Public Interest Oversight Body. 
• The European Commission proposed a set of measures to register hedge fund 
managers and managers of alternative investment funds and measures to regulate 
executive compensation. 
• Adopted measures to create a new European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and a 
European System of Financial Supervisors. The European Central Bank has been 
entrusted with providing analytical, statistical, administrative, and logistical 
support to the ESRB. 
The euro area countries initially sketched out a broad response to the financial crisis. Since then, 
their response to bank foreclosures and to subsequent issues has been characterized by some as 
somewhat disjointed. The financial crisis and economic downturn have exposed deep fissures 
within the EU and even within the euro area countries over the policy course to follow. As a first 
response to the financial crisis, EU governments and their central banks focused policy initiatives 
on reassuring credit markets that there was an availability of credit and liquidity, by reducing 
interest rates, and by providing foreign currency, primarily dollars, through currency 
arrangements. In addition to continuing efforts to restore the financial markets, EU members also 
face a worsening economic climate that has required actions by individual central banks, 
international organizations, and coordinated actions by EU members and other governments. 
Financial Crisis 
As the loss of real and financial wealth worsened, EU governments worked both independently 
and in tandem to protect financial institutions and to sustain economic growth. The actions EU 
leaders take are important to the United States, because EU members comprise some of the 
largest financial centers in the world, their financial markets are well developed, and European 
financial firms are often competitors to those in the United States. The economic and financial 
crises, however, have exposed deep philosophical differences among EU members over the most 
effective policy course to pursue to address the financial crisis and the economic downturn and 
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problems of integration and consistency across countries. In part, these differences reflect the 
dual nature of the EU system, which gives great deference to the individual members of the EU in 
interpreting and implementing EU Directives. Unlike the United States, where the Federal 
government can implement policies that are applied systematically across all 50 States, EU-wide 
actions reflect compromise among 27 national authorities.2  
The financial crisis has made EU members especially concerned about the size and structure of 
financial systems and they are pursuing changes to the international financial system. Financial 
systems have become large, complex, interconnected structures that have grown so large that 
some observers question whether the current financial system is compatible with maintaining 
financial stability. They also raise concerns about the ability of national governments to restrain 
the impact of financial firms on public resources should major financial firms face periods of 
serious distress. The United Kingdom and the United States, for instance, are the two largest 
international banking centers in the world. As such, they operate as major conduits, or as 
intermediaries, through which capital flows from countries with excess capital to those countries 
in need of capital. Banking centers in the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and elsewhere are 
notable because they are large compared to their respective national gross domestic product 
(GDP) and large compared to the relative size of banking centers in the United States. Bank assets 
in Switzerland, for instance, are nearly nine times the size of the country’s GDP, while such assets 
are over four times GDP in the United Kingdom. In Spain, Germany, France, and Ireland, bank 
assets are at least double GDP, while such assets run less than 60% of GDP in the United States. 
In an effort to address the prospect that large banks or financial firms may become insolvent or 
fail and, thereby, cause a major disruption to the financial system, the British Parliament in 
February 2009 passed the Banking Act of 2009. The act makes permanent a set of procedures the 
U.K. Government had developed to deal with troubled banks before they become insolvent or 
collapse. Such procedures are being considered by other EU governments and others as they 
amend their respective supervisory frameworks. 
Within the EU system, the greatest share of responsibility for regulating and supervising financial 
markets rest with the national governments. National authorities implement EU Directives in 
ways they determine are consistent with their own national objectives and national interests, not 
necessarily to benefit the EU as a whole. As a consequence of this focus at the national level, 
there is some potential for nations to act in their own interests at the expense of other EU 
members, especially during periods of financial and economic distress. The financial crisis also 
has aggravated conflicts between broad EU-wide goals and the more focused national objectives 
of the individual EU members. For instance, as financial markets faced serious shortages of 
liquidity, EU members were pressed to support a broad set of measures to increase the guarantees 
on bank accounts for depositors in response to actions by Ireland, Greece, and Germany. In 
addition, some EU members have been considering a set of procedures to deal with the bad loans 
of banks within their jurisdictions, which has pushed the EU as a whole to follow suit and 
consider the best approach to deal with the toxic loans of EU banks. These differences may well 
become more pronounced as multilateral discussions shift from addressing the general goal of 
containing the financial crisis to the more contentious issues of specific market reforms, 
regulations, and supervision. 
                                               
2
 Members of the European Union are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Republic of Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
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The globalization of financial markets raises the stakes for a coordinated response within the EU 
and between the EU and the United States. In various ways, globalized financial markets 
challenge the effectiveness of the current framework of financial market supervision and 
coordination that is based on national interests. Significant differences remain among EU 
members and between EU members and the United States over the best approach to follow to 
supervise financial markets. Some EU members favor a strong central authority that can monitor 
financial markets, while others favor strong national authorities with a weaker role for an 
international body.  
The EU approach is also complicated by the requirement that new policies must mesh with the 
carefully crafted and highly negotiated Directives that already exist within the EU framework. 
These Directives act as guiding principles for EU members, and include the Stability and Growth 
Pact3, the Lisbon Principles,4 and the Financial Services Action Plan.5 Arguably, these agreements 
have helped stabilize economic conditions in Europe by bringing down the overall rate of price 
inflation and by reducing government budget deficits. In addition to these Directives, the EU 
members have adopted a series of measures that deal directly with an EU-wide effort to 
coordinate financial policies across all the EU members.  
As part of the overall EU effort to achieve financial and economic integration, the EU members 
have adopted such Directives as the Directive on Financial Services and the Financial Services 
Action Plan (FSAP).The integration of the financial services sector across borders, however, has 
been uneven, with integration progressing faster in the money, bond, and equity markets, and 
slower in the banking sector where much of the focus on international cooperation is being 
directed. According to the European Central Bank,6 retail banking services remain segmented 
along national lines as a result of differences in national tax laws, costs of national registration 
and compliance, and cultural preferences. Nevertheless, cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
within Europe have played an important role in internationalizing banking groups, which has led 
to significant cross-border banking activity. Integration within the banking sector in Europe also 
has increased since the euro-area countries adopted the euro as their single currency. 
                                               
3
 The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is an agreement by European Union members to conduct their fiscal policy in a 
manner that facilitates and maintains the Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union. The Pact was adopted 
in 1997 and is based on Articles 99 and 104 of the European Community Treaty, or the Maastricht Treaty, and related 
decisions. It consists of monitoring the fiscal policies of the members by the European Commission and the Council so 
that fiscal discipline is maintained and enforced in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The actual criteria that 
members states must respect are: (1) an annual budget deficit no higher than 3% of GDP, and (2) a national debt lower 
than 60% of GDP, or approaching that value. 
4
 The Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs is a plan adopted by EU members to improve economic growth and 
employment among the EU members by becoming the most competitive knowledge based economy in the world by 
2010. The comprehensive strategy includes adopting sustainable macroeconomic policies, business friendly regulatory 
and tax policies and benefits, improved education and training, and greater investment in energy efficient and 
environmentally friendly technology. Two major goals include total public and private investment of 3% of Europe’s 
GDP in research and employment by 2010, and an employment rate of 70% by the same date. A comprehensive report 
on the Lisbon Strategy is available at: http://ec.europa.EU/growthandjobs/pdf/kok_report_en.pdf. 
5
 The Financial Services Action Plan replaced the Investment Services Directive and contains a set of measures that are 
intended to remove the remaining formal barriers in the financial services market among EU members and to provide a 
legal and regulatory environment that supports the integration of the EU financial markets. The EU Financial Services 
Action Plan: A Guide, HM Treasury, the Financial Services authority, and the Bank of England, July 31, 2003. 
6
 EU Banking Structures, European Central Bank, October 2008. 
Financial Market Supervision: European Perspectives 
 
Congressional Research Service 6 
Other Major EU Financial Directives 
Investment Services Directive 
The EU has adopted a number of directives that provide a basic framework for EU members to 
coordinate financial regulation across the EU and to integrate financial sectors. One such 
directive is the Investment Services Directive (ISD) that entered into force on January 1, 1996. 
The ISD provided general principles for national securities regulations, with the goal of providing 
mutual recognition of regulations across the EU.7 The ISD created a “European Passport” that 
provided for a cross-border right of establishment for non-bank investment firms and the freedom 
to provide services across borders for investment firms to carry out a wide range of investment 
business. Under the passport, firms were authorized and supervised by domestic authorities, but 
could still provide specified investment services in other EU countries. Such cross border services 
included: collecting and executing buy and sell orders on an agency basis; dealing, managing and 
underwriting portfolios; and such additional services as providing investment advice, advising on 
mergers and acquisitions, safekeeping and administration of securities, and foreign exchange 
transactions. 
The European “passport” provision required member states to dismantle restrictive legislation 
that prevented cross-border branching and freedom of services. Nevertheless, EU members 
retained the responsibility for determining their own domestic laws and regulations concerning 
such issues as fitness, authorization, capital requirements, and protection of client assets. EU 
members could also impose rules and regulations on investment firms using the European 
passport as long as the rules and regulations were, “in the interest of the general good,” and 
applied to the business activities that the firms carried out in their state. The ISD opened up stock 
exchange membership in all member states to all types of investment firms, whether bank or non-
bank entities. Another objective of the ISD was to eliminate the so-called concentration rule in 
order to allow member states that lacked their own securities trading floor to access electronic 
terminals with investment firms and banks in other member states, thereby allowing them to be 
members of the markets on a remote electronic basis. 
Financial Services Action Plan 
In 1999, the EU replaced the Investment Services Directive with the Financial Services Action 
Plan (FSAP). The Plan consists of a set of measures that are intended to remove the remaining 
formal barriers in financial markets among EU members and to provide a legal and regulatory 
environment that supports the integration of EU financial markets.8 Similar to the ISD, the FSAP 
process supports a two pronged approach that combines EU directives with national laws. The 
EU directives provide for a general level of regulation concerning the provision of financial 
services across borders and the harmonization of national regulations governing cross-border 
activities. EU members, however, retain the right to regulate firms within their own borders, as 
long as those firms, whether foreign or domestic, are treated equally. The FSAP contains 42 
articles, 38 of which were implemented, that are intended to meet 3 specific objectives: (1) a 
                                               
7
 Davies, Ryan J., MiFID and a Changing Competitive Landscape, July 2008, p. 3; available at 
http://faculty.babson.edu/rdavies/MiFID_July2008_Davies15.pdf. 
8
 The EU Financial Services Action Plan: A Guide, HM Treasury, the Financial Services Authority, and the Bank of 
England, July 31, 2003. 
Financial Market Supervision: European Perspectives 
 
Congressional Research Service 7 
single wholesale market; (2) an open and secure retail market; and (3) state-of-the art rules and 
supervision. Wholesale measures relate to securities issuance and trading; securities settlement; 
accounts; and corporate restructuring. Retail measures relate to insurance; savings through 
pension funds and mutual funds; retail payments; electronic money; and money laundering. 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
The cornerstone of the FSAP’s achievement is the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
(MiFID), which became effective on November 1, 2007. The MiFID establishes a 
comprehensive, harmonized set of rules for Europe’s securities markets so financial services 
firms can provide investment services in each of the EU member states. MiFID retained the 
principles of the EU “passport” and extended the list of services and financial instruments that are 
covered by the passport procedures, including investment advice. MiFID also removed the so-
called concentration rule that required investment firms to route all stock transactions through 
established exchanges. 
MiFID introduced the concept of ‘maximum harmonization’ which places more emphasis on 
home state supervision. This is a change from the prior EU financial service legislation which 
featured a “minimum harmonization and mutual recognition” concept. Minimum harmonization 
provides for a law or a regulation that sets a floor, or a minimum standard, that EU countries were 
expected to meet in developing legislation. Maximum harmonization provides for a maximum 
level of a law or a regulation that sets the maximum allowable standard that can be adopted in 
domestic laws or regulations. At times some EU members have been accused of adopting 
domestic measures that exceed the EU standard in a manner that acted as a protectionist barrier. 
Some key elements of the MiFID are: 
• Authorization, regulation and passporting. Firms covered by MiFID are 
authorized and regulated in their “home state.” Once a firm is authorized, it can 
use the MiFID passport to provide services to customers in other EU member 
states. These services are regulated by the “home state” in which the firm is 
authorized. 
• Client categorization. MiFID requires firms to categorize clients as “eligible 
counter-parties,” professional clients, or retail clients, with increasing levels of 
protection. 
• Client order handling. MiFID places requirements on information that needs to 
be captured when firms accept client orders in order to ensure that a firm is 
acting in a client’s best interests. 
• Pre-trade transparency. MiFID requires the operators of various kinds of equity 
exchanges to make the best bid and offer prices available to potential buyers and 
sellers. 
• Post-trade transparency. MiFID requires firms to publish the price, volume and 
time of all trades in listed shares, even if executed outside of a regulated market, 
unless certain requirements are met to allow for deferred publication. 
• Best execution. MiFID will require that firms take all reasonable steps to obtain 
the best possible result in the execution of an order for a client. The best possible 
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result is not limited to execution price but also includes cost, speed, likelihood of 
execution and likelihood of settlement and any other factors deemed relevant. 
• Systematic Internalizer. A Systematic Internalizer is a firm that executes orders 
from its clients against its own book or against orders from other clients and are 
treated as mini-exchanges, which makes them subject to pre-trade and post-trade 
transparency requirements 
Capital Requirements Directive 
The Capital Requirements Directive, which became effective in January 2007, introduced a 
supervisory framework within the EU for investment management firms and banks. The purpose 
of the Directive is to move the EU towards complying with the Basel II9 rules on capital 
measurement, adequacy, and related market disclosure disciplines. This Directive promotes a risk 
based capital management methodology through a “three pillar” structure that includes (1) new 
standards that set out the minimum capital requirements that firms will be required to meet for 
credit, market, and operational risk; (2) requirements that firms and supervisors must decide 
whether they are holding enough capital to address the risks realized under Pillar I and act 
accordingly; and (3) requirements that firms publish certain details about their risks, capital, and 
risk management. The Directive also requires firms to make provision for a charge against their 
capital for operational risks in order to identify, monitor, manage, and report on certain types of 
external events that may have a negative effect on their capital. The Directive applies not only to 
internationally active banks, which is the main focus of the Basel II approach, but it also applies 
to all credit institutions and investment firms irrespective of the size, scope of activities, or levels 
of sophistication. Under the Directive, firms are required to meet rules governing the minimum 
amounts of their own financial resources they must have in order to cover the risks to which they 
may be exposed. 
EU Financial Supervisory Authorities 
Within the EU, there are a number of bodies that bring together the supervisors, finance ministers, 
and central bankers of the EU members, as indicated in Figure 1. These bodies are under the 
direction of the European Commission and the Ministries of Finance of the individual EU 
members, while they also are subject to the central banks and National Supervisors10 of each EU 
member. Within the European Council, the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) is 
one of the oldest bodies associated with the Council. ECOFIN is responsible for coordinating 
economic policy, performing economic surveillance, and for monitoring budget policy and 
preparing the EU’s budget. The key bodies in the EU banking sector include the following: 
• European Banking Committee. The committee consists of representatives of 
the ministries of finance of the EU members and advises the EU Commission on 
policy issues related to banking activities and on proposals in the banking area.  
                                               
9
 Basel II is the second of the Basel Accords, which are recommendations on banking laws and regulations issued by 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The purpose of Basel II is to create an international standard that 
banking regulators can use when creating regulations concerning requirements for capital adequacy that banks must 
meet to guard against the types of financial and operational risks that banks face. 
10
 National Supervisors are one or more supervisory authorities that are authorized at the national level and are 
accountable to national mechanisms to issue regulations, grant licenses, conduct supervision, and to take enforcement 
action. 
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• Committee of European Banking Supervision. The committee is comprised of 
representatives of supervisory authorities and central banks and coordinates on 
regulatory and supervisory convergence. 
• European Central Bank. The ECB’s main role is financial stability and 
monitoring in cooperation with national central banks and supervisory agencies. 
• Banking Supervision Committee. This committee brings together national 
central banks, banking supervisory authorities, and the ECB. It monitors and 
assesses developments in the euro area, analyses the impact of regulatory and 
supervisory requirements on financial system stability, and it promotes 
cooperation and exchange of information between central banks and supervisory 
authorities on issues of common interest. 
• Economic and Financial Committee. The committee includes representatives of 
ministries of finance, the European Commission, the ECB, and central banks to 
promote high-level assessments of developments in financial markets. 
• Financial Stability Table. This body meets twice a year to discuss financial 
stability issues. 
• Financial Services Committee. This committee is composed of representatives 
of the ministries of finance and the European Commission and discusses and 
provides guidance on cross-sector strategic and policy issues. 
Figure 1. Key Bodies in the EU Banking Sector-Stability Framework 
 
Source: OECD Economic Studies: Euro Area, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2009. 
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In addition to the committees and bodies indicated in Figure 1, there are other components to the 
EU financial structure. Some EU members have negotiated Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) agreements that commit the parties to a regular exchange of information and to 
consultation on enforcement of regulations. EU members also have developed “Colleges” of 
supervisors that represent each EU member in coordinating policies on financial activities that 
cross national borders, principally in such specific areas of financial services as insurance and 
banking. In addition, three financial services committees organized under the so-called 
Lamfalussy process11 promote financial sector integration in the banking, insurance, and 
securities sectors. These committees are designated as Level 3 committees since they operate at 
the third stage in a process designed to coordinate efforts among the EU members in order to 
build support to implement legislation. 
Within the EU, the structure of financial market supervision varies markedly, as indicated in 
Table 1. Likewise, the objectives and mandates of the supervisory authorities, the central banks, 
the Ministries of Finance, and other organizations also vary by individual country, according to a 
staff report prepared by the International Monetary Fund.12 Among the 27 members of the EU, a 
little more than half have a single supervisory authority overseeing the banking sector, while 
slightly less than half have a sectoral model, or a supervisory authority that focuses on a 
particular segment of the financial services industry. The central bank is involved in supervising 
the financial markets in every EU country, but it acts as a supervisory authority in only half of the 
members. In all of the EU members, the banking supervisory authority supervises banks and 
insurance providers and in all but one country, the supervisory authority also supervises securities 
firms. In slightly fewer countries, the banking supervisory authority also supervises the 
management of pension funds. Also, in nearly every EU country, the banking supervisory 
authority is responsible for maintaining stability in the financial system and for protecting the 
deposits and other interests of consumers. Fewer than half of the banking supervisory authorities 
are responsible for supervising the conduct of firms within the financial sector and only about 
one-third are responsible for maintaining or ensuring that there is competition in the market. 
 
                                               
11
 The Lamfalussy process, named after Alesandre Lamfalussy who chaired the EU advisory committee that created it, 
was adopted by the EU members in 1999 to accelerate the legislative process in the EU relative to financial services 
legislation in order to meet the implementation deadline of the financial Services Action Plan by 2005. The process is 
composed of four levels, each focusing on a specific stage in the implementation of legislation with the EU. Level I 
establishes the core values of a law and is the traditional EU decision making, in which decisions are adopted as 
Directives or Regulations proposed by the Commission and then approved under the co-decision procedure by the 
European Parliament and the EU Council. At the second level, sector-specific committees and regulators provide 
advice on developing the technical details of the principles that were adopted in Level I. At the third level, national 
regulators work on coordinating new regulations with other nations. The fourth level involves compliance and 
enforcement. This process is intended to promote consistent interpretation, convergence in national supervisory 
practices, and an improvement in the quality of legislation on financial services. 
12
 Hardy, Daniel, A “European Mandate” for Financial Sector Authorities in the EU, in Euro Area Policies: Selected 
Issues, the International Monetary Fund, IMF Country Report No. 08/263, August 2008. 
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Table 1. European Union Financial Supervisory Structures 





































Austria   X X X X X X X X X X  
Belgium   X  X X X X X  X X X 
Bulgaria X   X X X X X X X  X  
Czech Rep.   X X X X X X X X X  X 
Cyprus X   X X X X X X X  X X 
Denmark   X  X X X X X X X X  
Estonia   X  X X  X X X X X  
Finland X    X X  X X X X X  
France X    X X  X X X  X  
Germany   X X X X  X X X X X  
Greece X   X X X  X X X X X  
Hungary   X  X X X X X X X X X 
Ireland   X  X X  X X X  X X 
Italy X   X X X X X X X X X X 
Latvia   X  X X X X X X  X  
Lithuania X   X X X  X X X  X X 
Luxembourg      X X X X X  X  
Malta   X  X X  X X  X X X 
Netherlands  X  X X X X X X X X X X 
Poland   X  X X X X X X    
Portugal X X  X X X X X X X  X  
Romania X   X X X X X X X    
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Slovakia   X X X X X X X X X X X 
Slovenia X   X X X X X X X  X  
Spain X   X X X X X X X  X  
Sweden   X  X X X X X X  X  
United 
Kingdom   X  X X  X  X  X  
Source: Hardy, Daniel, A “European Mandate” for Financial Sector Authorities in the EU, in Euro Area Policies: Selected Issues, International Monetary Fund. IMF Country 
Report No. 08263, August 2008, p. 76. 
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The “European Framework for Action” 
As an initial response to the financial crisis, the European Commission released on October 29, 
2008, its “European Framework for Action” as a way to coordinate the actions of the 27 member 
states of the European Union.13 On November 16, 2008, the Commission announced a more 
detailed plan that brings together short-term goals to address the current economic downturn with 
the longer-term goals on growth and jobs that are integral to the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and 
Jobs that was adopted by the EU in 2000 and recast in 2005.14 The short-term plan focuses on a 
three-part approach to an overall EU recovery action plan/framework. The three parts to the EU 
framework are: 
• A new financial market architecture at the EU level. The basis of this 
architecture involves implementing measures that EU members have announced 
as well as providing for: (1) continued support for the financial system from the 
European Central Bank and other central banks; (2) rapid and consistent 
implementation of the bank rescue plan that has been established by the member 
states; and (3) decisive measures that are designed to contain the crisis from 
spreading to all of the member states. As the financial system is stabilized, the 
next step is to restructure the banking sector and to return banks to the private 
sector. Proposals include: deposit guarantees and capital requirements; regulation 
and accounting standards; credit rating agencies; executive pay; capital market 
supervision; and risk management. 
• Dealing with the impact on the real economy. The policy instruments that can 
be employed to address the expected rise in unemployment and decline in 
economic growth are in the hands of the member states. Nevertheless, the EU can 
assist by adding short-term actions to its structural reform agenda, while 
investing in the future through: (1) increasing investment in R&D innovation and 
education; (2) promoting flexicurity15 to protect and equip people rather than 
specific jobs; (3) freeing up businesses to build markets at home and 
internationally; and (4) enhancing competitiveness by promoting green 
technology, and overcoming energy security constraints and achieving 
environmental goals. In addition, the Commission will explore a wide range of 
ways in which EU members can increase their rate of economic growth. 
• The impact of the financial crisis on the real economies of the EU members 
likely will require adjustments to the fiscal and monetary policies of the EU 
members. The Stability and Growth Pact16 of the EU members should serve as 
                                               
13
 From Financial Crisis to Recovery: A European Framework for Action, Communication From the Commission, 
European Commission, COM(2008) 706 final, October 29, 2008. 
14
 The Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs is a plan adopted by EU members to improve economic growth and 
employment among the EU members by becoming the most competitive knowledge based economy in the world by 
2010. The comprehensive strategy includes adopting sustainable macroeconomic policies, business friendly regulatory 
and tax policies and benefits, improved education and training, and greater investment in energy efficient and 
environmentally friendly technology. Two major goals include total public and private investment of 3% of Europe’s 
GDP in research and employment by 2010, and an employment rate of 70% by the same date. A comprehensive report 
on the Lisbon Strategy is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/pdf/kok_report_en.pdf 
15
 The combination of labor market flexibility and security for workers. 
16
 The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is an agreement by European Union members to conduct their fiscal policy in a 
(continued...) 
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the blueprint for members facing higher than expected levels of fiscal or 
monetary stimulus so that such policies should be accompanied by structural 
reforms. Such reforms should aim to sustain domestic demand in the short-run, 
ease transitions within and into the labor market, and increase potential growth 
by directing investment into areas that will sustain employment and advance 
productivity. Reforms in the finance sector should focus on enhancing the 
competitive position of the European industry and finance the needs of small and 
medium-sized firms. The Commission will also attempt to counter an expected 
increase in unemployment by using funds provided under the European Social 
Fund17 to reintroduce unemployed workers back into the work force. 
• A global response to the financial crisis. The financial crisis has demonstrated 
the growing interaction between the financial sector and the goods- and services-
producing sectors of economies. As a result, the crisis has raised questions 
concerning global governance that are relative to the financial sector and to the 
need to maintain open trade markets. The EU used the November 15, 2008 multi-
nation economic summit in Washington D.C. to promote a series of measures to 
reform the global financial architecture. The Commission argued that the 
measures should include: (1) strengthening international regulatory standards; (2) 
strengthening international coordination among financial supervisors; (3) 
strengthening measures to monitor and coordinate macroeconomic policies; and 
(4) developing the capacity to address financial crises at the national regional and 
multilateral levels. Also, a financial architecture should be constructed upon three 
key principles: (1) efficiency; (2) transparency and accountability; and (3) 
representation in any group should include key emerging economies. 
The de Larosiere Report and the European Plan for Recovery 
When the European Union released its “Framework for Action” in response to the immediate 
needs of the financial crisis, it was moving to address the long-term requirements of the financial 
system. As a key component of this approach, the EU commissioned a group within the EU to 
assess the weaknesses of the existing EU financial architecture. It also charged this group with 
developing proposals that could guide the EU in fashioning a system that would provide early 
warning of areas of financial weakness and chart a way forward in erecting a stronger financial 
system. As part of this way forward, the European Union issued two reports in the first quarter of 
2009 that address the issue of supervision of financial markets. The first report,18 issued on 
February 25, 2009, and commissioned by the European Union, was prepared by a High-Level 
Group on financial supervision headed by former IMF Managing Director and ex-Bank of France 
                                                             
(...continued) 
manner that facilitates and maintains the Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union. The Pact was adopted 
in 1997 and is based on Articles 99 and 104 of the European Community Treaty, or the Maastricht Treaty, and related 
decisions. It consists of monitoring the fiscal policies of the members by the European Commission and the Council so 
that fiscal discipline is maintained and enforced in the European Monetary Union (EMU). The actual criteria that 
member states must respect are (1) an annual budget deficit no higher than 3% of GDP, and (2) a national debt lower 
than 60% of GDP or approaching that value. 
17
 The European Social Fund, created in 1957, is the EU’s main financial instrument for assisting members in 
implementing their own plans for investing in workers. 
18
 Report, The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, Chaired by Jacques de Larosiere, February 25, 
2009. 
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Governor Jacques de Larosiere and, therefore, is known as the de Larosiere Report. The second 
report19 was published by the European Commission to chart the course ahead for the members of 
the EU to reform the international financial governance system.  
The de Larosiere Report 
The de Larosiere Report focused on four main issues: (1) causes of the financial crisis; (2) 
organizing the supervision of financial institutions and markets in the EU; (3) strengthening 
European cooperation on financial stability, oversight, early warning, and crisis mechanisms; and 
(4) organizing EU supervisors to cooperate globally. The report proposed 31 recommendations on 
regulation and supervision of financial markets. The recommendations are summarized in 
Appendix.  
The report argued that the financial crisis was characterized by a systemic failure to correctly 
price the risk of financial instruments as a result of plentiful liquidity, low returns, and investors 
seeking higher yields. Together, these events led to a fundamental failure by financial firms to 
adequately assess the risks associated with their activities and it exposed a systemic failure on the 
part of regulators and financial supervisors. In this environment, long-standing practices that 
relied on the risk management capabilities of the financial institutions themselves and on the 
adequacy of credit ratings all proved to be inadequate. Too much attention was paid to each 
individual firm and too little attention was given to the impact of general developments on sectors 
or markets as a whole. According to the report, “These developments point to serious limitations 
in the existing supervisory framework globally, both in a national and cross-border context.”20 
According to the report: 
Regulators and supervisors focused on the micro-prudential supervision of individual 
financial institutions and not sufficiently on the macro-systemic risks of a contagion of 
correlated horizontal shocks. Strong international competition among financial centers also 
contributed to national regulators and supervisors being reluctant to take unilateral action.21 
As the financial crisis unfolded, the de Larosiere Report concluded, the regulatory response by 
the European Union and its members was weakened by, “an inadequate crisis management 
infrastructure in the EU.” Furthermore, the report emphasized that an inconsistent set of rules 
across the EU as a result of the closely guarded sovereignty of national financial regulators led to 
a wide diversity of national regulations reflecting local traditions, legislation, and practices. 
While micro-prudential supervision focused on limiting the distress of individual financial 
institutions in order to protect the depositors, it neglected the broader objective of macro-
prudential supervision, which is aimed at limiting distress to the financial system as a whole in 
order to protect the economy from significant losses in real output. In order to remedy this 
obstacle, the report offered a two-level approach to reforming financial market supervision in the 
EU. This approach centers around new oversight of broad, system-wide risks and a higher-level 
of coordination among national supervisors involved in day-to-day oversight.  
                                               
19
 Driving European Recovery, Communication for the Spring European Council, Commission of the European 
Communities, April 3, 2009. 
20
 Report, The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, Chaired by Jacques de Larosiere, February 25, 
2009, p. 10. 
21
 Ibid., p. 11. 
Financial Market Supervision: European Perspectives 
 
Congressional Research Service 16 
The de Larosiere Report recommended that the EU create a new macro-prudential level of 
supervision called the European Systemic Risk Council (ESRC) chaired by the President of the 
European Central Bank, as indicated in Figure 2. This proposal was adopted by the European 
Commission with some changes, including changing the name to the European Systemic Risk 
Board (ESRB). A driving force behind creating the ESRB was that it would bring together the 
central banks of all of the EU members with a clear mandate to preserve financial stability by 
collectively forming judgments and making recommendations on macro-prudential policy. The 
ESRB will also gather information on all macro-prudential risks in the EU, decide on macro-
prudential policy, provide early risk warning to EU supervisors, compare observations on 
macroeconomic and prudential developments, and give direction on the aforementioned issues. 
The EC also followed the report’s recommendation to create a new European System of Financial 
Supervision (ESFS) to transform a group of EU committees known as L3 Committees22 into EU 
Authorities. The three L3 Committees are the Committee of European Securities Regulators 
(CESR); the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS); and the Committee of 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS). The ESFS will maintain 
the decentralized structure that characterizes the current system of national supervisors, while the 
ESFS will coordinate the actions of the national authorities to maintain common high level 
supervisory standards, guarantee strong cooperation with other supervisors, and guarantee that the 
interests of the host supervisors are safeguarded. 
Under this system, the European Central Bank (ECB) will have no micro-prudential role in 
supervising banks, but it will lead efforts within the European System of Central Banks (ESCB)23 
on macro-prudential supervision. In part, these macro-prudential activities include: (1) analyzing 
financial stability; (2) developing an early warning system to signal the emergence of risks and 
vulnerabilities of the financial sector to specific shocks and to issues that have cross-border and 
cross-sector dimensions; and (3) developing macro-prudential requirements. 
                                               
22
 Level 3 committees represent the third level of the Lamfalussy process the EU uses to implement EU-wide policies. 
At the third level, national regulators work on coordinating new regulations with other nations, and they may adopt 
non-binding guidelines or common standards regarding matters not covered by EU legislation, as long as these 
standards are compatible with the legislation adopted at Level 1 and Level 2. 
23
 The European System of Central Banks is comprised of the European Central Bank, which represents those countries 
that have joined the Euro area, and the central banks of all of the members of the European Union. 
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Figure 2. European Financial Supervision in the de Larosiere Report  
 
Source: Report, The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, February 25, 2009. 
The main tasks of the ESFS authorities are to provide legally binding mediation between national 
supervisors; adopt binding supervisory standards; adopt binding technical decisions that apply to 
individual institutions; provide oversight and coordination of colleges of supervisors; license and 
supervise specific EU-wide institutions; provide binding cooperation with the ESRB to ensure 
that there is adequate macro-prudential supervision; and assume a strong coordinating role in 
crisis situations. The main mission of the national supervisors would be to oversee the day-to-day 
operation of firms. 
The report envisioned the creation of the ESFS as a multi-year process that would be 
accomplished in two stages, but this multi-year phase-in was adjusted by the EC to one year in 
the final legislation. The first stage would have taken a year and would have served to prepare the 
groundwork for the transformation of the EU supervisory system by strengthening the national 
supervisors, harmonizing national legislation, strengthening the Level 3 committees, and 
expanding the use of supervisory colleges. In the second stage, which was expected to take two 
years to accomplish, the level 3 committees were to be transformed into the three Authorities 
previously mentioned. In addition to continuing to perform the functions currently assigned to 
these committees,24 the new European Authorities would (1) have the authority to resolve 
disputes between national supervisors regarding financial institutions operating across national 
                                               
24
 These functions include: advising the European Commission on regulatory and other issues, defining overall 
supervisory policies, convergence of supervisory rules and practices, financial stability monitoring, and oversight of 
supervisory colleges. 
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borders; (2) be responsible for the licensing and direct supervision of some specific EU-wide 
institutions; (3) play a decisive role in the interpretation and development of technical standards; 
(4) be responsible for establishing supervisory standards and practices; (5) work closely with the 
ESRC to assure that the ESRC can carry out its responsibilities for macro-prudential supervision; 
(6) facilitate exchanges of information in crisis situations and act as a mediator when necessary; 
and (7) represent EU interests in bilateral and multilateral discussions relating to financial 
supervision. 
The de Larosiere Report also considered a framework for dealing with distressed or failing banks, 
especially when those banks have a presence across several national jurisdictions. Typically, the 
report argued, distressed or failing banks should be handled by national central banks, where they 
exist, because central banks likely would be the first to see signs of trouble. However, 
inconsistent crisis management and resolution tools across the EU compound efforts to contain 
bank crises. Similarly, EU governments have adopted different deposit guarantee schemes that are 
inconsistent across the EU and seem to be geared toward a minimum coverage level. This 
inconsistent approach worsens the shift of deposits among banks during periods of perceived 
weakness and raises the prospect that banks of different national origin that operate within a 
single country could offer different levels of depositor protection within the same country. As a 
result of extensive cross-border branching by some banks, the report proposes that national 
supervisory authorities have the authority to inquire whether the home countries maintain 
sufficient deposit guarantees that they can protect the deposit of bank branches in host countries. 
In those cases where the deposit guarantee schemes are not sufficient, the report proposes that 
national supervisory authorities have the ability to curtail the cross border expansion of banks into 
their jurisdictions until such deposit guarantees are provided.  
The final section of the de Larosiere Report focused on the role of financial sector supervision in 
the context of highly integrated and interconnected global financial markets in which financial 
problems can be transmitted quickly around the globe. The report argued that the EU should take 
a leading role in reforming the international financial architecture by improving its own 
regulatory and supervisory system. Next, the report argued that the EU should promote 
international consistency of regulatory standards by strengthening bilateral dialogues on 
regulation among the main financial centers and by providing a clear mandate for international 
institutions that determine standards. In particular, the report argues that a strengthened and 
broadened Financial Stability Forum (now the Financial Stability Board) would be in the best 
position to coordinate international work on standards. The report also recommended that there 
should be international colleges of supervisors that can supervise large complex cross-border 
financial groups. In addition, the Report recommended that central banks should monitor more 
closely the growth in monetary and credit aggregates and there should be greater macroeconomic 
surveillance to monitoring macroeconomic policies, exchange rates and global imbalances. In 
addition to strengthening the IMF’s existing macroeconomic surveillance mechanism, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the FSF would be tasked with placing greater emphasis 
on macro-prudential concerns to provide an early warning system that would be intended to help 
prevent financial crises. In case another financial crisis should appear, the report recommended 
that there should be clear multilateral arrangements for coordinating national responses. 
Driving European Recovery 
“Driving European Recovery,” issued by the European Commission (EC), presented a slightly 
different approach to financial supervision and recovery than that proposed by the de Larosiere 
group, although it accepts many of the recommendations offered by the group. This approach 
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ultimately was adopted by the EU. The recommendations in the report were intended to 
complement the economic stimulus measures that were adopted by the EU on November 27, 
2008, under the $256 billion Economic Recovery Plan25 that funded cross-border projects, 
including investments in clean energy and upgraded telecommunications infrastructure. The plan 
was meant to ensure that “all relevant actors and all types of financial investments would be 
subject to appropriate regulation and oversight.” In particular, the EC plan noted that nation-based 
financial supervisory models are lagging behind the market reality of a large number of financial 
institutions that operate across national borders. 
The EC praised the de Larosiere Report for contributing “to a growing consensus about where 
changes are needed.” Of particular interest to the EC were the recommendations to develop a 
harmonized core set of standards that can be applied throughout the EU. The EC also supported 
the concept of a new European body similar to the proposed European Systemic Risk Council, 
but named the European Systemic Risk Board, to gather and assess information on all risks to the 
financial sector as a whole. It also supported the concept of reforming the current system of EU 
Committees that oversee the financial sector. The EC plan, however, accelerates the plan 
proposed by the de Larosiere group by combining the two phases outlined in the report. Using the 
de Larosiere report as a basis, the EC intends to establish a new European financial supervision 
system. These efforts to reform the EC’s financial supervision system are based on five key 
objectives: 
• First, provide the EU with a supervisory framework that detects potential risks 
early, deals with them effectively before they have an impact, and meets the 
challenge of complex international financial markets. The legislative package 
presented to the European Council, and adopted, includes two elements: 
measures to establish a European supervision body to oversee the macro-
prudential stability of the financial system as a whole; and proposals on the 
architecture of a European financial supervision system to undertake micro-
prudential supervision. 
• Second, the EC intends to move to reform those areas where European or 
national regulation is insufficient or incomplete by proposing a number of items, 
including: (1) a comprehensive legislative instrument that establishes regulatory 
and supervisory standards for hedge funds, private equity and other systemically 
important market players; (2) a White Paper on the necessary tools for early 
intervention to prevent a similar crisis; (3) measures to increase transparency and 
ensure financial stability in the area of derivatives and other complex structured 
products; (4) legislative proposals to increase the quality and quantity of 
prudential capital for trading book activities and complex securitization; (5) 
proposals to address liquidity risk and excessive leverage; and (6) a program of 
actions to establish a more consistent set of supervisory rules. 
• Third, to ensure European investors, consumers and small and medium-size 
enterprises can be confident about their savings, their access to credit and their 
rights, the EC will: advance a Communication on retail investment products to 
strengthen the effectiveness of marketing safeguards; provide additional 
                                               
25
 A European Economic Recovery Plan: Communication From the Commission to the European Council, Commission 
of the European Communities, COM(2008) 800 final, November 26, 2008. The full report is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/president/pdf/Comm_20081126.pdf 
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measures to reinforce the protection of bank depositors, investors, and insurance 
policy holders; and implement measures on responsible lending and borrowing. 
• Fourth, in order to improve risk management in financial firms and to align pay 
incentives with sustainable performance, the EC intends to strengthen the 2004 
Recommendation on the remuneration of directors and bring forward a new 
Recommendation on remuneration in the financial services sector, followed by 
legislative proposals to include remuneration schemes within the scope of 
prudential oversight. 
• Fifth, to ensure more effective sanctions against market wrongdoing, the EC 
intends to: review the Market Abuse Directive,26 and make proposals on how 
sanctions could be strengthened in a harmonized manner and better enforced. 
Conclusions 
National authorities are searching for consensus on an international framework to supervise and 
regulate the complex international financial system. The financial crisis has demonstrated that 
financial markets are complex, highly integrated and interconnected. At the same time, there are 
important gaps in the current state of knowledge concerning the nature of the complex linkages 
that characterize international financial markets. There seems to be some consensus that any new 
financial architecture should correct the shortcomings of the current system by incorporating a 
number of features. These features include increased transparency, greater oversight over credit 
rating firms and underwriting standards, mark-to-market accounting, registration and supervision 
over hedge funds and other derivative markets, and some supervision of the credit default swap 
market. Beyond supporting increased supervision over these broad areas of market activities, 
policymakers remain divided over the specific ways that such supervision should be 
administered.  
Some policymakers also argue that the international financial system can be strengthened through 
improvements in the data that are collected on financial activities. The Bank of England, for one, 
argues that the international financial system can benefit from collecting data on the international 
flow of funds comparable to the U.S. flow of funds accounts. These accounts provide data on 
financial linkages between domestic and foreign residents and between different parts of the 
financial sector and the real economy.27 Policymakers are also focusing on the current size and 
structure of financial systems in which some institutions have such a far-ranging effect on the 
financial system that they are deemed to be too big to fail. Policymakers are weighing the benefits 
of having such firms hold higher amounts of capital and liquidity or limit their activities through 
regulation or oversight. This issue is particularly pressing for some European countries in which 
the size of some financial firms is greater than the national GDP and the failure of such firms can 
be highly destabilizing to the economy.  
                                               
26
 The Market Abuse Directive was adopted by the European Commission in April 2004. The Directive is intended to 
reinforce market integrity in the EU and contribute to the harmonization of the rules against market abuse and 
establishing transparency and equal treatment of market participants in such areas as accepted market practices in the 
context of market manipulation, the definition of inside information relative to derivatives on commodities, and the 
notification of the relevant authorities of suspicious transactions. 
27
 Financial Stability Report, The Bank of England, June 2009, p. 46. 
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Furthermore, academics and policymakers are assessing various proposals to address the 
tendency for the financial system and the real economy to act in a mutually reinforcing, or 
procyclical, manner. During periods of rapid economic growth and appreciation in the value of 
assets, the financial markets make credit more readily available, thereby reinforcing the economic 
boom and the prospects for an asset bubble. Similarly, as an economic boom ends and the real 
economy begins to slow down, credit markets tighten up, reinforcing the economic contraction. 
Central banks and policymakers are also focusing on methods and procedures to intervene with 
banks and other large financial firms that are facing insolvency or failure to provide for an orderly 
resolution of the firms to maintain market stability. The UK experience with a set of procedures it 
made permanent in February 2009 may prove useful to some policymakers. The EU 
acknowledges the importance of this issue, but it has left it up to individual EU members to 
develop their own approaches. 
In the current environment, policymakers and academics also are reconsidering the role central 
banks play as systemic risk regulators. Central banks acted swiftly to address and contain the 
financial crisis, which has led some policymakers to weigh the benefits of expanding or amending 
the role of central banks in the supervision of financial markets. Expanding the role of central 
banks has some benefits, since central banks generally have the requisite economic resources, the 
political clout, and the ability to act quickly. Some policymakers, however, question the long-term 
impact of concentrating market power in an independent agency. In comparing across countries, 
the statutory role of the central bank is not clear and can vary substantially. As a result, some 
national governments apparently are considering altering the statutory authority of the central 
bank to make risk oversight a specific responsibility.  
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Appendix. Summary of Recommendations of the de 
Larosiere Report on EU Financial Market 
Supervision28 
1. Basel II rules should be amended to: (1) gradually increase minimum capital 
requirements; (2) reduce pro-cyclicality by encouraging dynamic provisioning of 
capital buffers; (3) introduce stricter rules for off-balance sheet items; (4) tighten 
norms on liquidity management; (5) strengthen rules for band internal control 
and risk management. 
2. Adopt a common definition of regulatory capital, including which hybrid 
instruments should be considered as Tier 1 capital.  
3. Relative to regulating credit rating agencies: (1) credit rating agencies should be 
regulated and supervised by a strengthened Committee of European Securities 
Regulators (CESR); (2) the credit rating agencies’ business model should be 
reviewed and an assessment should be made of separating rating and advisory 
activities; (3) the use of ratings in financial regulation should be reduced; (4) 
distinct codes should be introduced for rating structured products. 
4. Mark-to-market accounting rules should be reviewed to: (1) expedite solutions to 
the remaining accounting issues concerning complex products; (2) ensure they do 
not bias business models, promote pro-cyclical behavior, or discourage long-term 
investment; (3) allow the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) or 
other standards setting groups clarify and agree on a common, transparent 
methodology for valuing assets in illiquid markets; (4) have the IASB open its 
standard-setting process to regulatory, supervisory, and business communities; 
(5) strengthen the IASB’s oversight and governance structure. 
5. The Solvency 2 Directive29 regulations on insurers and reinsurers should be 
adopted and include a balanced group support regime, coupled with sufficient 
safeguards for host member states, a binding mediation process between 
supervisors, and established harmonized insurance guarantee schemes. 
6. Competent authorities in all member states must have sufficient supervisory 
powers, including sanctions, to ensure the compliance of financial institutions 
with the rules, and they must be equipped with strong, equivalent, and deterrent 
sanctions to counter all types of financial crimes. 
7. Relative to the “parallel banking system” (hedge funds, investment banks, other 
funds, and mortgage banks): (1) appropriate regulations should be extended to all 
firms or entities conducting financial activities of a potentially systemic nature; 
(2) transparency should be improved, especially for systemically important hedge 
funds; there should be capital requirements on banks owning or operating hedge 
funds. 
                                               
28
 Report, The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, Chaired by Jacques de Larosiere, February 25, 
2009. 
29
 The Solvency II Directive attempts by 2012 to bring insurers and reinsurers under the same regulatory regime that 
will provide a single set of rules that govern what constitutes an acceptable level of insurer creditworthiness. 
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8. Securitized products and derivatives markets should: (1) simplify and standardize 
over-the counter-derivatives; (2) introduce and require the use of at least one 
well-capitalized central clearing house for credit default swaps in the EU; (3) 
guarantee that issues of securitized products retain on their books for the life of 
the instrument a meaningful amount of the underlying risk. 
9. Common rules should be developed for investment funds, including definitions, 
codification of assets and rules for delegation, accompanied by tighter 
supervisory control over the independent role of depositories and custodians. 
10. Member states and the European Parliament should work toward greater 
harmonization in rules by avoiding legislation that permits inconsistent 
transposition and application, and they should identify national exceptions that 
would improve efficiency by their removal, reduce distortions of competition and 
regulatory arbitrage, or improve the efficiency of cross-border financial activity 
in the EU. 
11. Compensation incentives must be better aligned with shareholder interests and 
long-term firm-wide profitability by basing the structure of financial sector 
compensation schemes on the following principles: (1) bonuses should be set in a 
multi-year framework; (2) the same set of rules should be applied to proprietary 
traders and asset managers; and (3) bonuses should reflect actual performance 
and not be guaranteed in advance. 
12. Internal risk management should be: independent and responsible for effective, 
independent stress testing; senior risk officers should hold a very high rank in the 
company; and internal risk assessment and proper due diligence must not be 
neglected by overreliance on external ratings. 
13. The EU should have a coherent and workable regulatory framework for crisis 
management; a framework that is transparent; the relevant authorities should be 
equipped with appropriate and equivalent crisis prevention and crisis 
management tools; and legal obstacles that prevent the use of these tools in a 
cross-border crisis should be removed. 
14. Deposit Guarantee Schemes should be harmonized and prefunded by the private 
sector and provide high, equal protection to all bank customers throughout the 
EU; the schemes should protect all customers; and the existing authorities of host 
countries regarding cross-border bank branches should be reviewed. 
15. Member states should agree on more detailed criteria for burden sharing 
(providing financial aid from the public and private sector) than those contained 
in existing agreements. 
16. The EU should create a new body called the European Systemic Risk Council 
(ESRC) to pool and analyze all information, relevant for financial stability, 
pertaining to macro-economic conditions and to macro-prudential developments 
in all the financial sectors. 
17. The EU should put in place an early warning system under the auspices of the 
ESRC and of the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) to: (1) prioritize and 
issue macro-prudential risk warnings; (2) direct risks that potentially could affect 
the financial sector or the economy to the EFC to implement a strategy to address 
those risks; (3) warn the IMF, the FSF, and the BIS if risks relate to global 
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dysfunction of the monetary and financial system; and (4) take additional action 
if the response of a national supervisor is inadequate.  
18. A European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) should be established to: (1) 
work with the existing national supervisors who would continue to carry out day-
to-day supervision; (2) replace three existing structures (Committee of European 
Banking Supervisors (CEBS), Committee of European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS), and the Committee of European 
Securities Regulators (CESR) with three new European Authorities tasked with 
coordinating supervisory standards and guaranteeing strong cooperation between 
national supervisors; also (3) colleges of supervisors should be established for all 
major cross-border institutions. 
19. National supervisory authorities should be strengthened to upgrade the quality of 
supervision, including: (1) reforming national systems by aligning supervisors’ 
competences and powers on a comprehensive system in the EU, increasing 
supervisors’ remuneration, facilitating exchanges of personnel between the 
private sector and supervisory authorities, and ensuring that all supervisory 
authorities implement a modern and attractive personnel policy; and (2) 
intensifying the training and personnel exchanges of the level 3 committees; 
carrying out an examination of the degree of independence of all national 
supervisors. 
20. The EU should develop a more harmonized set of financial regulations, 
supervisory powers, and sanctioning regimes. 
21. The level 3 committees (national regulators) should: (1) gain a significant 
increase in their resources; (2) upgrade the quality and impact of peer review 
processes; (3) prepare for establishing supervisory colleges30 for all major cross-
border financial firms in the EU by the end of 2009. 
22. The EU should establish an integrated European System of Financial Supervision 
(ESFS) and the level 3 committees should be transformed into three European 
Authorities – a European Banking Authority, a European Insurance Authority, 
and a European Securities Authority – with boards comprised of the chairs of the 
national supervisory authorities and have their own autonomous budget and a set 
of key competencies that include: legally binding mediation between national 
supervisors; adoption of binding supervisory standards; and binding technical 
decisions applicable to individual financial institutions. 
23. Planning for an integrated European System of Financial Supervision should 
begin immediately with a detailed plan for implementation developed before the 
end of 2009. 
24. The ESFS should be reviewed within three years of its implementation and 
additional reforms considered. 
25. The Financial Stability Board should be in charge of promoting the convergence 
of international financial regulation to the highest benchmarks, the Board should 
                                               
30
 Supervisory colleges are intended to be a formal structure that brings together the relevant national authorities under 
a lead supervisor to coordinate policies on cross-border financial activities. 
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be enlarged, it should report to the IMF, and it should be transformed into a 
decision-making Council. 
26. Supervisory colleges for large complex, cross-border financial groups should 
carry out robust, comprehensive risk assessments, should pay greater attention to 
banks’ internal risk management practices and should agree on a common 
approach to aligning incentives in private sector remuneration schemes. 
27. The IMF should be placed in charge of developing and operating a financial 
stability early warning system, accompanied by an international risk map and 
credit register. 
28. Efforts should be intensified to encourage jurisdictions that currently are poorly 
regulated or “uncooperative” to adhere to the highest level of international 
standard and to exchange information among supervisors. Supervisors should 
increase capital requirements for those financial institutions that are investing in 
or doing business with poorly regulated jurisdictions. 
29. EU members should show their support for strengthening the role of the IMF in 
macroeconomic surveillance and to contribute towards increasing the IMF’s 
resources in order to strengthen its capacity to support member countries facing 
acute financial or balance of payment distress. 
30. The EU should organize itself so it can represent itself in a coherent manner in 
the new global economic and financial architecture. 
31. In its bilateral relations, the EU should intensify its financial regulatory dialogue 
with key partners. 
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